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T
his year marks the tenth anniver-
sary of the East Asia crisis, which 
began in Thailand on July 2, 1997, 
and spread to Indonesia in October 
and to Korea in December. Eventu-
ally, it became a global ﬁnancial crisis, embroil-
ing Russia and Latin American countries, such 
as Brazil, and unleashing forces that played out 
over the ensuing years: Argentina in 2001 may 
be counted as among its victims.
What is remarkable to me today is that there 
are those who favor easy money to bail Wall 
Street out of the current credit crunch to dam 
the problems that could otherwise ﬂow down-
stream. Is this learning or hypocrisy? I fear hy-
pocrisy.
A LONG HARD RECOVERY
There were innocent victims of the East Asian crisis, including countries that had not even 
engaged in the international capital ﬂows that 
caused the crisis. Indeed, Laos was among the 
worst-affected countries. Though every crisis 
eventually ends, no one knew at the time how 
broad, deep, and long the ensuing recessions 
and depressions would be. It was the worst 
global crisis since the Great Depression.
As the World Bank’s chief economist and se-
nior vice president, I was in the middle of the 
conﬂagration and the debates about its causes and 
the appropriate policy responses. This summer 
and fall, I revisited many of the affected coun-
tries, including Malaysia, Laos, Thailand, and 
Indonesia. It is heartwarming to see their recov-
ery. These countries are now growing at 5% or 
6% or more—not quite as fast as in the days of 
the East Asia miracle, but far more rapidly than 
many thought possible in the aftermath of the 
crisis.
Many countries changed their policies, but 
in directions markedly different from the re-
forms that the IMF had urged. The poor were 
among those who bore the biggest burden of the 
crisis, as wages plummeted and unemployment 
soared. As countries emerged, many placed 
a new emphasis on “harmony,” in an effort to 
redress the growing divide between rich and 
poor, urban and rural. They gave greater weight 
to investments in people, launching innova-
tive initiatives to bring health care and access 
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to ﬁnance to more of their citizens, and creating 
social funds to help develop local communities. 
In contrast, the IMF policies often ignored these 
social dimensions. In Thailand, IMF induced 
cutbacks in the health budget led to a resur-
gence in AIDS, which the government had done 
so much to curtail. Not surprisingly, the pro-
creditor bankruptcy laws which they foisted on 
countries often met with resistance.
LESSONS LEARNED OR IGNORED
Looking back at the crisis a decade later, we can see more clearly how wrong the diagno-
sis, prescription, and prognosis of the IMF and 
United States Treasury were. Had, for instance, 
Korea’s problems been as severe and funda-
mental as they had suggested, Korea would not 
have enjoyed the rapid comeback it had. The 
fundamental problem was premature capital 
market liberalization. Malaysia imposed capital 
controls, and as a result it had the shortest and 
shallowest of downturns; and when it recovered, 
it was left with less of a legacy of debt. Yet this 
lesson seems to be ignored with respect to In-
dia. It is ironic to see the US Treasury Secretary 
once again pushing for capital market liberaliza-
tion in India—one of the two major developing 
countries (along with China) to emerge un-
scathed from the 1997 crisis.
It is no accident that the very countries that 
had not fully liberalized their capital markets 
have done so well. Subsequent research by the 
IMF has conﬁrmed what every serious study had 
shown: capital market liberalization brings in-
stability, but not necessarily growth. (India and 
China, who have not liberalized capital markets, 
have been the fastest-growing economies.)
Of course, Wall Street (whose interests the 
US Treasury represents) proﬁts from capital mar-
ket liberalization: they make money as capital 
ﬂows in, as it ﬂows out, and in the restructuring 
that occurs in the resulting havoc. In South Ko-
rea, the IMF urged the sale of the country’s banks 
to American investors, even though Koreans had 
managed their own economy impressively for four 
decades, with higher growth, more stability, and 
without the systemic scandals that have marked 
US ﬁnancial markets with such frequency.
In some cases, US ﬁrms bought the banks, 
held on to them until Korea recovered, and then 
resold them, reaping billions in capital gains. In 
its rush to have Westerners buy the banks, the 
IMF forgot one detail: to ensure that South Ko-
rea could recapture at least a fraction of those 
gains through taxation. Whether US investors 
had greater expertise in banking in emerging 
markets may be debatable; that they had greater 
expertise in tax avoidance is not.
HYPOCRISY OR LEARNING IN THE SUB-PRIME CRISIS?
The contrast between the IMF/US Treasury advice to East Asia and what has happened 
in the current sub-prime debacle is glaring. East 
Asian countries were told to raise their interest 
rates, in some cases to 25%, 40%, or higher, 
causing a rash of defaults. In the current crisis, 
the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Cen-
tral Bank cut interest rates, fearing the collapse 
that high interest rates could cause.
The countries caught up in the East Asia 
crisis were lectured on the need for greater 
transparency and better regulation. But lack of 
transparency played a central role in this past 
summer’s credit crunch; toxic mortgages were 
sliced and diced, spread around the world, pack-
aged with better products, and hidden away as 
collateral, so no one could be sure who was 
holding what. Yet, there is now a chorus of cau-
tion about new regulations, which supposedly 
might hamper ﬁnancial markets (including their 
exploitation of uninformed borrowers, which 
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lay at the root of the problem). Finally, despite 
all the warnings about moral hazard, Western 
banks have been partly bailed out of their bad 
investments.
It would be reassuring if this contrasting at-
titude to today’s crisis represents a learning of 
what I preached ten years ago. Am I too cynical 
in suggesting that it is simply hypocrisy?
Following the 1997 crisis, there was a con-
sensus that fundamental reform of the global 
ﬁnancial architecture was needed. Why has noth-
ing been done? Look no further than the fact that 
while the current system leads to unnecessary 
instability and imposes huge costs on develop-
ing countries, the current system serves the proﬁt 
interests of many well. It is not surprising, then, 
that ten years later, there has been no fundamen-
tal reform. Nor, that the world is once again fac-
ing a period of global ﬁnancial instability, with 
uncertain outcomes for the world’s economies.
Letters commenting on this piece or others may 
be submitted at submit.cgi?context=ev.
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